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Abstract—The prevalence of on-line auctions has stimulated
the interest of both the economists and computer scientists in an
effort to understand and improve their rules. One famous form
of these economic mechanisms is the double auction and, more
speciﬁcally, the continuous double auction which is commonly
used in today’s major stock exchanges worldwide. Software
agents constitute a promising tool for the study and implemen-
tation of novel double auction mechanisms. TAC Market Design
tournament makes an attempt to study the competition among
such dynamically adjusted market institutions trying to attract
potential traders while maximizing their proﬁt. In this paper
we describe the tournament and discuss about the importance
of the global competitive equilibrium in its economy. Moreover,
we provide a simple, yet effective estimation technique for the
latter that our entrant, Mertacor, has utilized during the games
of 2008.
Keywords-Double Auction, Market Based Control, Mecha-
nism Design, Trading Agent Competition
I. INTRODUCTION
The invasion of the Internet in our daily life has given
rise to new, innovative applications of e-commerce. Common
examples include electronic marketplaces and online trading
systems that most of the major stock exchanges use to trade
futures, options, equities, and their derivatives.
The double auction (DA) is an auction where multiple
buyers and sellers are able to make committed offers to buy
and sell units of a commodity and then accept similar offers.
Besides its prevalence in ﬁnancial markets, many variants
of the DA have been successfully applied as a solution to
a multitude of resource allocation problems [1], [2]. The
importance of DAs lies in the fact that they exhibit a high
allocative efﬁciency (ratio of traders’ actual proﬁt to their
theoretical maximum proﬁt) with the implementation of very
simple rules.
Mathematicians, economists and computer scientists have
long used game theory to analyze simple forms of this
mechanism [3]–[5] but their ﬁndings have been criticized for
being of scant relevance to practical scenarios due to their
strict assumptions, like traders’ full rationality. Moreover,
the dynamics of the continuous DA presents an important
obstacle in any pure theoretical approach. This led to the
adoption of simulation techniques where human subjects
trade to verify the effectiveness of the mechanism [6]. The
need to reduce experimental cost as well as the increasing
requirements for a fully controlled environment inroduced
the use of multi-agent systems in this kind of experiments,
a ﬁeld known as Agent-based Computational Economics [7].
The majority of the research on DAs focuses on the
bidding strategies of the traders. However, scientists have
recently turned their attention to the rules and the protocols
of this mechanism. Most of the relevant literature deals with
isolated markets which operate free of charge. Nevertheless,
in today’s global economy each country’s market institutions
compete with each other as well as with the remainder stock
exchanges worldwide. Having recognized this, scientists
from the universities of Liverpool and Southampton, and
Brooklyn College introduced TAC Market Design (or CAT)
tournament1 in 2007, in a joint effort to study the impact of
this globalization on trading.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows: Section
2 provides a description of the CAT tournament. In section
3 we introduce the notion of the global competitive equi-
librium. We also present a method for its estimation and
shortly describe how our entrant has utilized this technique
for the games of 2008. Section 4 presents the results of our
experiments. Finally, a brief summary concludes the paper
in Section 5.
II. TAC MARKET DESIGN TOURNAMENT 2008
The CAT game consists of two distinct entities: trading
agents (or traders) and specialists. Each trader may be either
a buyer or a seller willing to exchange goods, whereas each
specialist represents the auctioneer of a DA market where
these traders will trade. Trading agents are provided by the
organizers and specialists are designed by the competition
entrants. There is also a server responsible for the commu-
nication among the clients and the timing of the games.
The platform of the tournament is JCAT2, a client-server
implementation of the Java Auction Simulator API (JASA3),
providing additional support for the operation of multiple
markets [8].
Traders are equipped with a market selection strategy and
a trading strategy. The former speciﬁes the specialist to
register with for their trades and is typically based on their
1http://www.marketbasedcontrol.com
2http://jcat.sourceforge.net
3http://jasa.sourceforge.netproﬁt from the market. The trading strategy determines their
bidding behavior in the market and follows one of the four
extensively studied strategies in the DA literature:
1) ZI-C [9]: These trading agents exhibit zero rationality,
selecting their offers randomly from a uniform distri-
bution, but are not allowed to trade at a loss.
2) ZIP [10]: ZIP traders try to remain competitive in a
market by adjusting their proﬁt margin according to
current market conditions.
3) RE [11]: RE trading agents make an attempt to mimic
human behavior on trading, using recent proﬁt as a
reward in a learning algorithm.
4) GD [12]: These traders consider the history of ex-
ecuted transactions and submitted offers and form
a belief function based on which they select their
preferred offers.
Every trader is endowed with a set of goods to trade and
a private value (the maximum amount willing to purchase
or the minimum accepted sale’s price for buyers and sellers
respectively) for each of them. Both strategies and endow-
ment constitute personal information which is not revealed
to the competitors during the game.
Each game of CAT comprises several virtual trading days,
each of which is further divided in trading rounds of ﬁxed
duration. At the beginning of each day, specialists announce
their fees and traders must decide upon which market to
select for the rest of this day. Traders’ offers are single-
unit (every offer expresses their desire to trade one unit
of the good) and persistent (once accepted, offers remain
active until they result in transactions or the end of the
day is reached). Traders’ private values are drawn from an
unknown distribution at the start of the game and remain
constant for the rest of it.
The daily evaluation of the entrants consists of three parts:
(i) the market-share, which is the percentage of the total
traders’ population registered in the market, (ii) the proﬁt-
share, which is the ratio of the daily proﬁt a specialist
obtains to the proﬁt of all specialists, and (iii) the transaction
success rate (TSR), which is the percentage of the offers
accepted that result in transactions. The daily score of each
specialist is the mean value of the above metrics. Assessment
commences and terminates in randomly selected trading
days and total score is the sum of the scores across these
days [13].
III. THE GLOBAL COMPETITIVE EQUILIBRIUM
A. Background
According to the theory of microeconomics, the aggregate
demand and supply curves of a market are expected to
meet at a point (pair of price and quantity) which is called
the Competitive Equilibrium (CE) of the market. If all the
transactions are cleared at the price of the CE then the
market’s allocative efﬁciency is maximized.
The global CE is the CE of the equivalent single global
market where all of the buyers and sellers would trade had
it not been their splitting due to the existence of multiple
specialists. In an efﬁcient global allocation only globally
intra-marginal traders (buyers and sellers with private values
above and below the price of the global CE respectively) are
allowed to transact.
However, the diffusion of the traders in the various mar-
kets presents the opportunity for the globally extra-marginal
traders (buyers and sellers with private values below and
above the price of the global CE respectively) to transact
either for the reason that they might be intra-marginal ones
for the market registered with or because of the inability
of the speciﬁc auctioneer’s rules to prevent extra-marginal
trades, thus leading to a drop in both global and market’s
allocative efﬁciency. It is therefore to the entrant’s interest to
identify this equilibrium and coordinate its transaction prices
with it.
B. Estimation
Most of the CE estimation techniques to our knowledge
try to predict the price of this point using the history of
the transaction prices observed in the market [14], [15],
and so are highly dependent on the pricing strategies of the
opponent specialists for the case of the global CE. In this
paper we follow a different approach.
More speciﬁcally, our entrant continually keeps track of
the highest bids (buy offers) and lowest asks (sell offers)
submitted in its market. The prices of these offers constitute
the closest observable estimation of their private values.
However, our specialist has only access to a restricted
number of trading agents, the ones registered with its own
market. To overcome this limitation our contestant exploits
the possibility of subscription to the opponent markets,
gaining access to the offers submitted in its competitors (four
different opponents are observed each day due to the volume
of the offers), and thus accelerating the estimation process.
When a sufﬁcient number of traders have been explored
(80% of the total trader population for the games of 2008),
Mertacor uses the 4-heap algorithm [16] to estimate the
global CE price in time O(LlogL), where L is the number
of the offers recorded. Our estimation method is based on the
observation that when there is a sufﬁciently large population
of traders, the real global CE (p;q) and the reported global
CE (p0;q0) almost coincide, as illustrated in Figure 1.
C. Mertacor Specialist
We now discuss how Mertacor, which was placed 5th in
the ﬁnals of CAT 2008, utilizes the information gained from
the estimation technique mentioned above.
The ﬁrst responsibility of a specialist is to select the offers
that will possibly lead to transactions. This is the task of the
accepting policy. Our entrant records the number of daily
transacted items Mi per trading agent i over the last days.Figure 1. An example of a global DA market. DD and SS are the
true global aggregate demand and supply curves and D’D’, S’S’ the
corresponding reported curves.
This number provides us with an estimation of the traders’
entitlement, i.e. the number of the goods that they are willing
to trade. If n is the number of our daily traders, for the ﬁrst
N = maxi(Mi);i 2 f1;:::;ng; trading rounds Mertacor
implements a global equilibrium beating accepting policy,
according to which the prices of the qualiﬁed offers must
be better (higher for buyers and lower for sellers) than the
global CE price, allowing only globally intra-marginal trades
to take place.
Accepted offers are maintained in a so called order book.
An entrant must then select the pairs of offers that will
lead to transactions according to its matching policy. In
the case of Mertacor this policy implements the 4-heap
algorithm discussed above, such that the highest bids placed
are matched with the lowest qualiﬁed asks.
The clearing policy and pricing policy determine the time
and price of the transactions respectively. For the ﬁrst N
rounds all of the transactions are cleared at the end of each
round and their price is set at the global CE price, so that a
trader’s proﬁt is proportional to the difference of its offer’s
price and that of the global CE. For the remaining trading
rounds, Mertacor acts like a modiﬁed continuous DA market,
so a transaction is executed as soon as there is an available
qualiﬁed pair of bids and asks. Our modiﬁcation lies in the
pricing strategy, which uses a variation of the side-biased
pricing policy, introduced by IAMwildCAT in 2007 [15],
such that globally intra-marginal traders are given a higher
priority. According to this policy, if bj is the price of the
jth bid accepted and al is the price of the corresponding lth
ask price, then the transaction price p will be:
p = kbj + (1   k)al (1)
The parameter k is equal to the ratio of the mean number
of buyers to trading agents registered with our specialist over
the last ﬁve days and is limited in the interval [0:3;0:7].
When a trade between a globally intra-marginal and a
globally extra-marginal trader takes place, k obtains one of
the two extreme values in this interval so as to provide more
proﬁt to the former agent.
Finally, the charging policy selects the type and amount of
fees a specialist should charge trading agents for the services
provided in its market. Mertacor implements a limited score-
based charging policy. According to this policy, our entrant
estimates the scores of its opponents and tries to beat them
in time intervals proportional to their score differences.
There are four different kinds of fees in the tournament
(a registration fee for the registration with the specialist,
an information fee to obtain additional information from
opponent markets, a shout fee for each offer submitted, a
transaction fee for each transaction conducted, and a proﬁt
fee, which is a percentage of the trader’s proﬁt from a
transaction). Nevertheless, we have decided to charge only
a small proﬁt fee, so that only proﬁtable traders pay for
our entrant’s services, and we limit its value in the interval
[0:2;0:3] to avoid a possible loss of signiﬁcant portion of
market-share.
IV. EXPERIMENTS
We conducted a number of experiments to assess the
effectiveness of our technique over each of the trading
strategies in CAT. More speciﬁcally, we have used 6 different
specialists obtained from the TAC agent repository4 and 240
trading agents (120 buyers and 120 sellers). All traders
follow the same trading strategy (ZI-C, ZIP, RE, GD) and
an -greedy market selection strategy ( = 0.1,  = 1) [17].
Moreover, traders’ private values were drawn from the same
distribution, which was either a uniform U(50;150) or a
normal N(100;278) distribution, as is commonly assumed
in the experimental economics literature. The duration of the
games was 500 trading days and each day consisted of 10
trading rounds. Each experiment was repeated 10 times. Our
results are not statistically signiﬁcant, considering the length
of the games (four hours approximately) which presents an
important limitation for such an outcome.
Figures 2a - 2d illustrate the probability density functions
(PDFs) of the real and estimated traders’ private values for
each type of bidding strategies and each distribution, which
were obtained using the Parzen window method [18]. As
can be seen, our technique accurately acquires the real PDFs
for both the normal and the uniform distribution of private
values in the ﬁrst three cases (ZIP, ZI-C, RE). We observe
a small divergence for the case of the GD trading strategy,
which is justiﬁed by the fact that these agents strategically
wait to submit their offers, thus resulting in a lack of
submitted offers from a noticeable number of trading agents
(approximately 17% of the total trader population for our
experiments), so there is no possible way to estimate their
preferences for the goods traded.
4http://www.sics.se/tac/showagents.php(a) ZIP (b) ZI-C
(c) RE (d) GD
Figure 2. Real and estimated private value distributions for each trading strategy.
Table I shows the values of the absolute percentage error
(APE) for our estimation over the four trading strategies and
the two private value distributions discussed above. These
values verify once again the effectiveness of our method
as well as its robustness. The results are slightly better for
the normal distribution with an expected maximum APE
less than 0.8% in every case. Moreover, it seems that our
technique works best with the ZIP traders, which yield the
smallest mean APE. Finally, despite the minor problems with
the GD traders, the mean APE for these trading agents is
less than 0.18% for both distributions.
V. CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORK
In this paper we have shortly described TAC Market
Design tournament as well as our agent’s policies. We
have also introduced a successful way of estimating the
global competitive equilibrium, which constitutes the most
valuable component of our specialist’s strategy, and have
experimentally conﬁrmed its efﬁcacy.
The importance of this point is twofold. From a market
designer’s perspective, the successful approximation of this
equilibrium may help him meet his design objectives. From
Table I
ABSOLUTE PERCENTAGE ERROR OF THE ESTIMATED GLOBAL
COMPETITIVE EQUILIBRIUM PER TRADING STRATEGY AND
DISTRIBUTION OF PRIVATE VALUES.
Absolute Percentage Error (%)
ZIP ZI-C RE GD
U(50;150)
Mean 0.017 0.055 0.116 0.163
Min 0.002 0.007 0 0.128
Max 1.835 1.238 2.196 0.352
N(100;278)
Mean 0.004 0.044 0.057 0.177
Min 0 0.006 0 0.043
Max 0.214 0.529 0.766 0.483
the trading agent’s view, this estimation might provide the
opportunity to obtain novel bidding strategies for multiple
double auction markets. Moreover, the global competitive
equilibrium could be utilized from an arbitrageur (trader that
exploits the price difference of the same good exchanged in
multiple markets, buying it low and then selling it high) to
identify the most proﬁtable stock exchanges for its tradesirrespective of the markets’ pricing policies implemented.
While we have demonstrated that our technique is sound
for homogeneous populations of traders, we must further
investigate its effectiveness when buyers and sellers follow
different trading strategies. It is also useful to see the
inﬂuence of the specialists’ strategy mix selected on our
results. Finally, we plan to conduct experiments where
traders’ private values are afﬁliated, as this is true in many
practical scenarios.
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